Gulf NRIs and Their Remittances to India: The Saga of Overlooked Great Expectations by Pattanaik, Sitikantha
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES  
Volume 14, Number 1, 2007, pp.31-53 
 
31 
Gulf NRIs and Their Remittances to India: 







As the leading labour exporting country to the Gulf, and also as the largest recipient of annual 
remittance inflows, India occupies an enviable position in the world, particularly because of the strong 
and unmatched beneficial macroeconomic effects of remittances. This paper views remittances from the 
Gulf to India not only as a case of “rich dividend to the country on zero investment,” but also as a 
costless outcome characterized by “rich harvest from a policy of benign neglect.” This paper outlines 
the macroeconomic justifications for according specialized policy attention to remittances on par with 
other sector specific policies, ranging from exports to foreign direct investment, and argues that the 
Gulf NRIs as a group deserve such a focused policy framework in India as a reward for their indelible 
contributions to the Indian economy. Gulf NRIs represent an important interest group, with genuine 
justifications supporting their great expectations that someday India’s current policy of “benign 
neglect” will be replaced by a more focused policy framework, which not only could encourage 
remittance flows through an attractive policy environment, but also may lead to better harnessing of 
the immense growth and development potential of remittances. 
 





An estimated 12.5 million expatriates living in the six oil-rich Gulf countries (namely 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) remitted close to USD 28.5 billion to 
various labour exporting countries in 2005. India has been the leading remittance receiving 
country in the World for quite some time now, and in 2005-06, total remittance inflows to 
India alone amounted to as high as USD 24.6 billion. An estimated 3.5 million Non-Resident 
Indians (NRIs) living in the Gulf, accounting for about 28 percent of the total expatriate 
population of the Gulf, would have contributed close to USD 8 billion to India’s remittance 
inflows in 2005-06, and these NRIs have been a permanent and most stable source of 
strength and resilience to India’s balance of payments in more than last three decades. The 
macroeconomic policy environment of India, however, has growingly turned against the 
interest of these senders of remittances. More importantly, despite being the largest 
beneficiary of remittance inflows in the world, there is no clear policy in India for either 
attracting larger remittance inflows or for better harnessing the immense growth and 
development potential of remittances for the country.   
While every other important sector’s needs are treated with specific policy focus in India, 
staring from exports, to FDI, to tourism, to FII flows to software services, remittances 
                                                          
*The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author, and not of the organizations in 
which he may be working as a professional economist. The author is grateful to two anonymous 
referees for their insightful suggestions on the manuscript. A number of NRI friends in the Gulf 
created the motivation for preparing this paper by raising many valid questions during several 
informal discussions, which in fact also helped in identifying their great expectations.  
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receive much less importance in the sphere of macroeconomic policy making, and the 
policies are in fact increasingly becoming remittance unfriendly, particularly as far as the 
interest of the vast majority of the unskilled Gulf NRIs is concerned.  While the nominal 
exchange rate of the rupee is often allowed to appreciate these days (lowering thereby the 
rupee equivalent of remittances sent to the family members), the interest rates offered on 
various NRI deposit schemes have become much less attractive, and there are influential 
policy recommendations (like the recent one from the Fuller Capital Account Convertibility 
Committee Report) suggesting possible taxing of various NRI income in India. Domestic 
inflation in India has also been a concern for remittance receiving families of the poor NRIs, 
as most of these NRIs do not receive any wage increase in the Gulf even after working there 
for several years, and as a result they cannot prevent the erosion in purchasing power of fixed 
remittance amounts for their family members who reside in India. To the extent that evolving 
policy developments in India relating to exchange rate, interest rate and various instruments 
of fiscal policy are truly in the spirit of meeting the needs of an open competitive market 
economy, one could argue that the senders of remittances must adjust to this changing reality 
of the Indian economy. But in practice, when one finds that sector-specific policies are still 
in vogue, and areas like exports, software, tourism, FDI, FII flows, etc. are being encouraged 
through specific policy focus, it is felt as necessary to present the case of remittances as no 
less important in relation to any other sector/sub-sector in India’s balance of payments. 
Accordingly, most of the Gulf NRIs could raise this very valid questions as to why 
remittances should not receive specific policy focus in India’s macroeconomic management, 
and what alternative policy instruments the Government may be contemplating to attract 
larger inflows of remittances into India?  
While advocating such a specialized policy attention for remittances, it is important first 
of all to establish clearly the indelible contributions of remittances to the macroeconomic 
environment of India. The robust economic performance of India in the last one decade or so, 
and the emerging perception of a lack of external constraint to India’s economic growth, 
would not have been possible but for the strong performance on remittances. This paper aims 
at establishing the immense macroeconomic significance of remittances to India, and in that 
process strives to draw specific policy attention of the Government for this critical element in 
India’s balance of payments. Section-I presents certain harsh realties about the difficult 
conditions against which these remittance flows into India get generated. Section-II offers a 
quick review of the available recent literature on remittances to make the point that 
(surprisingly) no attempt has ever been made in the past to justify the need for a remittance 
focused exclusive policy framework in India. The enormous (and possibly unmatched) 
macroeconomic significance of remittances to India is outlined in Section-III, followed by a 
list of suggested policy options. Each argument offered in this section may require a more 
comprehensive re-look, if a remittance-focused policy approach is envisioned at some stage 
in India. Section-IV sets out a few concluding observations.  
 
 
2. SECTION-I: SOME HARSH FACTS, MYTHS, AND JUSTIFICATION FOR POLICY 
NEGLECT 
 
One may often wonder as to why the Gulf countries are so open to Asian workers, despite 
significant unemployment problem faced by the Gulf nationals themselves in the face of 
rising population and a distorted demography favouring the young population? An 




assessment of this issue itself will tell volumes about the conditions of expatriate Asian 
workers in the Gulf. As noted by Tattolo (2003), openness to Asian workers could be 
because they are “less expensive to employ, easier to lay off, and thought to be more 
efficient, obedient and manageable”. These expatriate workers have helped in converting the 
“financial wealth” accumulated from oil income into “real growth and development”.  As 
observed by Mohammed (2003), the Gulf States “bought” economic prosperity within a 
decade, what in fact had taken the industrial countries a century to achieve. The only major 
economic cost to the Gulf States in transforming their financial wealth quickly into real 
growth and development has been in the form of large remittance outflows from these 
countries (Table-1). 
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  28,519 3,265,000 
Note: Figures relate generally to 2004-05, and are based on available official statistics for the 
respective countries, which have also been supplemented by GCC Economic Statistics, Gulf 
Investment Corporation, and Worldfacts. In the population/ labour figures, expatriates whose labour 
cards/employment visas might have expired but they may be still working in the Gulf are not included, 
and hence, the total expatriate population in the Gulf is approximately stated to be about 12.5 million, 
of which about 3.5million could be Indians (i.e. more than the figures reported in this table). Number of 
NRIs in the Gulf relate to 2001 data presented in the Report of the Working Group on Cost of NRI 
Remittances submitted to RBI in May 2006.  
As per the figures reported in this table, about 12.5 million expatriates living in the Gulf remitted 
about USD 28.5 billion in 2005, which amounts to just about USD 190 per expatriate per month, which 
is not large, and essentially reflects the fact that more than 80 percent of the expatriates undertake very 
low paid jobs and remit almost the entire income, since basic essentials like accommodation and food 
are supplied by the local sponsors of such labourers as part of the contract. But for the higher wages of 
a small proportion of the skilled  expatriate class (whose size is growing, but still less than 10% in the 
total), the average per-capita remittance per month figure would have been even lower (say just about 
USD 100 per month). 
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In the initial phases of the oil boom that started in early 1970s, or even before, a large 
part of the labour force migrating to the Gulf was from the neighbouring poorer Arab states. 
Arab-Israeli war of 1948 led to forced migration of Palestinians; so was the case in respect of 
Iraqis after the Bath party’s coup in Baghdad in 1968, and Yemenis because of the civil war 
in that country. Iranians and Omanis also represented significant proportions of migrant 
workers in the Gulf those days. The wave, however, changed in favour of Asians because of 
major political developments. As documented by Mohammed (2003), the Iranian Revolution 
created the fear of risk associated with disgruntled foreign workforce in the Gulf countries, 
which led to gradual reduction in the number of Iranians in the expatriate labour force in the 
Gulf. During the Gulf war of early 1990s when the Governments of Yemen, Jordan and 
Palestine did not condemn the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, it had grave implications for their 
workforce in the Gulf. By the end of 1991 itself, about 8,00,000 Yemenis, 54,000 
Palestinians, and 3,00,000 Jordanians had to return to their respective countries from the 
Gulf. Because of Egypt’s anti-Iraq stance during this war, however, Egyptian workers were 
particularly encouraged during the reconstruction of Kuwait. In the post Gulf-war period, 
Gulf countries preferred expatriate workers who could have least to do with the domestic 
political, social and cultural conditions in the Gulf, and who could be driven by the only 
consideration of economic needs. Asian countries as cheap sources of labour, thus, emerged 
as quite attractive. Moreover, Gulf countries also adopted a policy of deliberately 
fragmenting the expatriate workforce into diverse nationalities. Four South Asian countries 
(i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and Philippines represent now the countries 
with the largest shares in the expatriate workforce in the Gulf, with Egypt being the only 
Arab country in that race. Country-wise distribution of the expatriate labour force of Oman 
presented in Table-2 shows the clear dominance of Indians in both public and private sectors, 
despite the policy of Gulf countries to diversify the nationalities of the expatriate workforce. 
 
Table 2: Country-Wise Distribution of Expatriate Workforce in Oman (2004) 
 
























Indians 256,903 60.5 Indians 6,405 41.3 
Bangladeshis 68,496 16.1 Egyptians 4,968 32.0 
Pakistanis 52,087 12.3 Sudanis 1,132 7.3 
Sri Lankans 6,782 1.6 Jordanians 695 4.5 
Philippinos 4,840 1.1 Other Arabs 1,340 8.6 
Egyptians 5,083 1.2 Pakistanis 315 2.0 
Other Nationalities 30,128 7.2 Others 648 4.3 
Total    424,319* 100 Total 15,503** 100 
Source: Statistical Yearbook-2005, Ministry of National Economy, Oman. 
*In the private sector, expatriates accounted for close to 83 percent of the total labour force, 
representing the high dependence of the private sector on labour exporting countries. If one takes into 
account about 1 lakh (i.e. 100 thousand) expatriates without valid labour cards (i.e. whose labour cards 
have expired but they may still be working in Oman), the dependence level will appear much higher. 
**In the public sector (including another 7,395 expatriates working in Public Corporations and the 
Diwan of Royal Court), expatriates accounted for only about 18 percent of the labour force, 
representing the progress on Omanization of the labour force in the public sector. 




The broad country-wise distribution of expatriate workers in the Gulf as published in 
various official statistics, however, do not reveal the segmentation of working conditions and 
differences in treatment for expatriates from different countries. As most vividly documented 
by Mohammed (2003), one could come across three distinct classes of expatriate workers in 
the Gulf, with the highly respected Westerners occupying the highest strata, who generally 
hold well-paid executive positions, with other lavish amenities like furnished 
accommodation, club membership, vacation allowance, etc.. Gulf employers even take pride 
in employing Westerners, since that symbolizes the strength of the sponsoring company. 
This treatment to Westerners has not changed post 9/11. Expatriates from the Arab World 
come second in the hierarchy, and because of their shared cultural and religious beliefs, they 
are treated almost like locals. They in essence integrate with local systems. In the third 
category come the vast majority of poorly paid Asians, who perform the hard manual labour 
in extreme climatic conditions for long hours, and are geographically isolated deliberately in 
work camps to avoid any contact with Arab society. As viewed by Mohammed (2003), “… 
they are ridiculed and stripped of any rights, given their low incomes and their uneducated 
status. Therefore, they tend to be outcasts in a society that depends on them for its basic 
functioning, and whose infrastructure their efforts built …. The ease with which they can be 
deported has made them wary of even exposing themselves to the risk of encountering the 
police.” For survival, they must avoid any confrontation with the locals.  
This low social status without any rights could be largely the result of low education and 
skills of the workforce coming from the Asian countries. As could be seen from the 
education profile of the expatriates working in UAE and Oman (i.e. countries for which 
recent data are available), the share of highly educated (i.e. post graduates) is less than only 2 
percent, whereas those below secondary school levels are higher than 70 to 80 percent, with 
some of them in fact being completely illiterate (Table-3 and 4). Sectoral distribution of 
expatriate workforce also reveals that large majority of them are employed in the 
construction sector, wholesale and retail trade, car repairs, and as domestic servants (Table-
5). These are the types of work local Gulf nationals, despite remaining unemployed, would 
abhor to do. As once candidly presented by the Economist (2002), “… Today’s young people 
(among the Gulf nationals) tend to assume that they will enjoy the same lifestyle as their 
parents, with a desk job and a state salary fat enough to support servants and idle wives, with 
cash left over for foreign travel and their children’s costly weddings, as well as such perks as 
generous housing loans.” They may find it difficult to realize that the party may be over. The 
policy of distributing oil wealth through generous Government schemes for the public along 
with offer of public sector jobs cannot be sustainable.  
It is the earlier Government policies in the Gulf to be blamed for creating a dual labour 
market condition, in which Gulf nationals simply won’t do the work of the expatriates, and 
the national Governments, as a result, cannot address the local unemployment problem 
without effective replacement of expatriates. Even though national policies (such as 
Saudization, Emiratisation, Omanization, etc.) repeatedly emphasize such replacement plans, 
on ground they are difficult to implement in the private sectors. As highlighted by 
Mohammed (2003), un-elected national rulers used redistribution of oil wealth among 
nationals as an easy means to maintain or buy support. “… nationals in most Gulf States 
were guaranteed employment in the large public bureaucracies, where productivity tended to 
be low, demanded minimal effort, required few skills, provided little training and offered 
large salaries. This nurtured a social acceptance and expectation of administrative and 
managerial positions, and converted Gulf nationals into white-collared salaried middle class, 
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who frowned upon manual blue-collar work.” The Government policies have had major 
detrimental consequences for the human resource development in the Gulf, and the effective 
participation of the local labour force in the private sector always remained extremely low. 
While policies on nationalization of the workforce could be implemented in the public sector 
(where nationals now account for more than 80 to 90 percent of the work force), in the 
private sector, which employs the vast majority of expatriates, the dependence on expatriates 
continues to be heavy at around 80 to 90 percent because of the very dual nature of the job 
market. As once highlighted in the Economist (2002), “easy money and state coddling have 
seriously weakened the work ethics” of locals. Expatriate workers not only work for longer 
hours, but accept very low salary, which may appear pittance to many locals. Any 
replacement of expatriates by locals, thus, will entail clear implications for the cost and 
productivity in the private sector in the Gulf countries, which could possibly make most of 
the private businesses economically unviable and unsustainable. Moreover, locals become a 
permanent burden for the hiring company, whereas expatriates work on the basis of short-
term contracts and can be fired easily. The difficulties in implementing policies on 
nationalization of labour force can be better gleaned from the stark reality presented in the 
Economist (2002) suggesting that “…… Saudi Arabia employs some 500,000 private 
chauffeurs for the simple reason that its women are not allowed to drive …… The estimated 
3 million domestic servants in the region, all foreigners, often endure conditions equivalent 
to indentured servitude, with housing and food subtracted from salaries, no time off and no 
fringe benefits …… The luxury of having a docile, cheap and disposable workforce is hard 
to resist.”  
The extent to which differences exist between monthly salaries of local nationals and 
expatriate workers could be gleaned from Table-6. (The Gulf countries rarely publish this 
information, particularly for the recent period, given the sensitivity involved in a dual labour 
market, even though they may be very much available in official records. This information is 
taken as published in Wilson (2004) for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Locals get almost 
three times of the monthly salaries of expatriates. Most educated expatriates, however, 
receive high remunerations (particularly those working in the oil and banking sectors), even 
though their number is insignificant in relation to the number of expatriate workers who are 
not that highly educated. This latter category does not receive much increase in salary, even 
after working for several years. The highly educated class, however, gets decent increases 
 
Table 3: Educational Background of UAE Non-National Population (2005) 
 
 Educational Background Percentage of Total 
1 Illiterate   9.1 
2 Literate 14.3 
3 Primary School 14.1 
4 Preparatory School 15.8 
5 Secondary School 23.8 
6 Diploma   4.5 
7 University 16.3 
8 Post Graduate   2.0 
9 Not Stated   0.1 
 Total 100 
Source: UAE Census, 2005. 




Table 4: Educational Background of Private Sector Expatriate Workforce in Oman 
(2004) 
 
 Educational Background No. of Expatriates Percentage of Total 
1 Pre Primary 185,195 43.6 
2 Primary School 64,370 15.2 
3 Preparatory School 81,038 19.1 
4 Secondary School 41,662 9.8 
5 Diploma 16,687 3.9 
6 University 32,356 7.6 
7 Post Graduate 3,011 0.7 
 Total 424,319        100 
Source: Statistical Yearbook-2005, Ministry of National Economy, Oman. 
 
 
Table 5: Sector-wise Distribution of Expatriates in the Private Sector of Oman 
 
 2004 2005 
Shares of Sectors in 
Total for 2005 (%) 
Agriculture and Fishing 45,742 45,723 10.76 
Mining and Quarrying 7,069 7,449    1.75 
Manufacturing 52,085 50,442 11.87 
Electricity, Gas and Water Connections 1,502 1,780  0.4 
Construction 115,552 119,125 28.0 
Whole Sale/Retail Trade and Car Repairing 97,380 86,257 20.3 
Hotels and Restaurants 22,648 24,916     5.87 
Transport, Storage and Communications 4,613 4,839     1.14 
Financial Intermediaries 1,363 1,443     0.34 
Real Estate and Renting Services 4,314 4,704     1.11 
Education 4,507 5,014     1.18 
Health and Social Work 8,988 10,006     2.36 
Community and Personal Services 4,128 4,488     1.06 
Domestic Servants 52,931 56,224  13.24 
More than One Activity 543 516    0.12 
Not Stated 954 1,862    0.43 
 424,319 424,788 100 
Source: Central Bank of Oman Annual Report, 2005. 
 
 
every year, often in excess of local inflation. The Survey of Gulf Compensation Trends for 
September 2006 conducted by Gulftalent covering 3000 professionals receiving annual 
salaries in the range of USD 12, 000 to USD 2,00,000 showed an annual increase of 7.9% in 
base salaries in the entire Gulf, with Qatar offering the highest increase of 11.1 per cent, and 
Oman offering the lowest increase of 5.6 percent. Such surveys and statistics, however, are 
not much relevant as far as the interest of the large mass of Asian labour force toiling in the 
Gulf is concerned. One survey findings for Indian expatriates working in the UAE as 
documented in Zachariah, Prakash and Irudaya (2001) suggest that 36 percent of the Keralite 
Indians (Kerala is the state in India which leads the supply of cheap labour from India to the 
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Gulf) working in the UAE could save less than 500 Dhirams (Rs. 6, 000) and another 37 
percent could save between 500 to 1,000 Dhirams (Rs. 6,000 to 12,000). These category of 
workers do not see much annual increase in annual compensation, and also face problems 
like non-payment of regular salaries, denial of wage and non-wage benefits as per the 
contract, no access to their own passport and non-payment of return air fare, as well as 
compulsion to pay a part of monthly income to the local sponsors in the Gulf who may only 
arrange the work permit but not the work.   
 
Table 6: Average Monthly Salaries in Saudi Arabia as per Educational Background 
(2000) 
 
 Saudi Nationals Expatriate Employees 
Illiterate    841   303 
Read and write    920   336 
Primary school 1,227   368 
Intermediate school 1,450   423 
Secondary School 1,920   688 
College Drop-outs 1,816   768 
University Graduate 2,905 1,488 
Post Graduate 5,630 2,895 
Average 1,878   628 
Source: Wilson (2004). 
Note: These are only broad comparisons, and hence have only indicative significance. Nationals on an 
average get almost three times of what the expatriates get. This is validated in Oman, where the 
minimum wage for the nationals is about RO 120 (or USD 312), whereas expatriates do similar work at 
as low as RO 40 (USD 104) or even less. This has been a major reason for which the private sector 
depends so heavily on expatriate workforce (besides also their higher efficiency, longer working hours, 
and ease at which they can be fired). 
 
Even though things are changing of late, particularly with greater demand for skilled and 
educated workforce from the Indian subcontinent, the overall dualistic pattern clearly 
dominates the labour market conditions in the Gulf, making the progress on any national 
policy in the Gulf relating to nationalization of the labour force at best slow and gradual.  
This slow process also explains the large presence of the Asian labor force in the Gulf. What 
is important, however, is to examine what policies the labour exporting countries like India 
might be adopting to benefit from these conditions in the Gulf, and how best they could 
respond to any future changes in the local job market conditions in the Gulf. An Indian 
Recruiting Office apparently was opened way back in July 1936 in Bombay to recruit 
workers for oil companies in the Gulf, under proper contract, and subject to the supervision 
of the Government of India office for the Protector of Emigrants. It has been a long time 
since then, but still there is no formal policy to justify how India views its importance as a 
major labour exporting country to the Gulf, and what policy framework it might have to 
harness the full potential of this comparative advantage of India, while at the same time 
contributing to protect the rights and interest of all Indian workers in the Gulf. In the absence 
of any such stated policy, one could tend to believe in what Mohammed (2003) viewed that 
some countries’ embassies play minimal role in protecting the legitimate rights of the 
workers, neglect social and economic status of their migrant workers, do little to improve the 




wage conditions, and even overlook many private recruitment agencies operating in the 
countries who fleece the migrants by charging very high fees for arranging work visas, which 
often mean only permission to work in the Gulf rather than any real job as such. 
Governments adopting such policies of “benign neglect” may be relying on the hope that 
“Gulf employers would find their workers more economical and thus attractive to recruit”. 
Not doing anything, therefore, could be a policy in itself, and what is the harm in having 
such a policy of “benign neglect,” particularly when the harvest in the form remittances 
could be so rich for the country? 
 
 
3. SECTION-II: POLICY RELEVANT INFERENCES FROM AVAILABLE EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH ON REMITTANCES 
 
The subject of remittance flows has generated considerable interest among policy makers 
as well as independent researchers, and several very elaborate but useful papers have been 
published in last few years alone (please see the references), which also report the findings of 
other similar studies conducted before 2001 (and hence not covered in this Section). Ignoring 
the obvious repetitive coverage of facts and issues, each of these recent papers contains 
certain policy relevant inferences, all of which taken together can be immensely helpful in 
designing a remittance-focused policy strategy in any major remittance receiving country. 
 
Most of the empirical studies generally highlight the “link between remittance and 
economic development”, role of remittance in imparting strength and resilience to country’s 
balance of payments, relative role of remittance compared with other inflows in the balance 
of payments  ranging from foreign aid to foreign direct investment, economic, social and 
political effects of remittances in the remittance receiving countries, factors explaining 
international migration and volume/pattern of remittance flows, etc. Besides the generally 
recognized beneficial effects of remittances on growth, balance of payments, poverty, 
local/regional development, etc., certain adverse effects are also occasionally mentioned, 
such as brain drain, Dutch Disease associated with remittance driven exchange rate 
appreciation, social imbalance and inequality in labour exporting pockets/regions, 
dependency-induced low productivity and creativity of remittance receiving families, and 
higher inflation resulting from remittance financed consumption. Each of these issues needs 
to be studied in country specific context, particularly in order to be able to design a relevant 
policy strategy on remittances. Some of the key inferences drawn from available research 
could supplement the country specific studies on important issues. 
As underscored by Ratha (2003 & 2005), unlike private capital flows that tend to be pro- 
cyclical (i.e. rising during economic boom and receding or reversing during an economic 
slowdown), remittance flows are stable, and even counter-cyclical (i.e. migrant workers may 
send more remittances to a country facing a financial crisis, which was evidenced in 
Indonesia, Mexico and Thailand). That explains the relative importance of remittances in 
relation to capital flows. High transaction cost, however, continues to be a worrisome issue, 
which explains partly the presence of large unrecorded remittances sent through informal 
channels. As per the findings of Ratha, remittance flows for the world as a whole exceeded 
USD 232 billion in 2005, with USD 167 billion flowing to developing countries. Unrecorded 
flows through informal channels could be expected to be at least 50 percent higher than 
recorded flows. Transaction costs may not be high for large value remittances, but for small 
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value remittances of less than USD 200, transaction costs could be as high as 10 to 15 
percent. Instead of using fiscal and other incentives to attract remittances, Ratha argued in 
favour of  use of other instruments like better domestic investment climate, lower transaction 
costs and improved domestic financial systems to encourage the remittance inflows and to 
enhance their beneficial impact. 
The relative significance of remittances compared with other capital flows appears 
particularly stronger when the concept of “net transfers” is used in relation to “net capital 
flows”, since the interest, profit and dividend outflows associated with capital flows are 
captured better in the concept of “net transfers”, and there are no such outflows associated 
with remittances, which are in the nature of “unrequited transfers”.  Emphasizing this aspect, 
Kapur (2004) also viewed that developing countries must use the slogan “migration not aid” 
along with the slogan “trade not aid” in global negotiations, because while external aid 
requires a costly Government bureaucracy for delivery of aid and also involves the major 
problem of siphoning off of funds, the delivery of remittance to the needy poor families is 
direct and more effective. Kapur also documented the major difference between India and 
China (the two countries having large shares in global migration) in terms of remittance 
inflows. Unlike India, China does not receive much of remittances, but the inflow of 
investment from overseas Chinese is several times higher than similar investment inflows 
from Indian NRIs.  
Besides the analyses of remittances and international migration as per the standard “push-
pull” factors, some studies try to better identify the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittance flows. Buch and Kuckulenz (2004) for example used a panel data set for 87 
developing countries and studied the remittance pattern in response to changes in factors like 
interest rate differential between home and host country, level of economic activity, rate of 
inflation, political risk factors in the sending country, etc. They found that some of the 
macroeconomic determinants could be common to both remittance flows and private capital 
flows, even though remittances still turn out to be more stable in relation to private capital 
flows. Ramamurthy (2003) used other important determinants like the exchange rate, wage 
rates, number of workers abroad, number of years working abroad, employment status of 
family members back home, marital status, etc.  
Shah (2005) emphasized Gulf-specific factors, which explain why a high percentage of 
Indian workers’ income is sent as remittance to India. The important ones include temporary 
nature of job contracts (implying that everybody has to return someday and cannot settle 
down in the Gulf), policy to discourage number of dependents in the Gulf (family visas are 
not given to all, and given the high cost of living in the Gulf most of the blue collar workers 
cannot bring their families even when allowed), rising levels of unemployment among locals 
and pressures on national Governments to replace expatriate workforce with locals, the rising 
costs of employment visas, etc. Higher fees in the Gulf are being generally used to 
discourage locals from hiring expatriates, and under amnesty schemes, illegal expatriates 
whose visa validity has expired are being given a chance to leave the country without much 
punishment. Because of the Gulf Government policies on effective replacement of 
expatriates by locals, demand for employment visas for expatriates has generally gone up in 
the face of tight supply conditions, increasing thereby the premium on such visa, and a 
system of visa-trading has started, where local sponsors can get regular monthly income just 
by sponsoring expatriate workers. The expatriate would look for a job himself, and give part 
of the monthly income to the local sponsor, who would have arranged only the visa for him. 
According to Shah (2005), the number of such workers sponsored by fictitious companies is 




as high as 600,000 in UAE, and in Saudi Arabia, 70 percent of the visas issued by the 
Government are sold in the black market. These harsh realities have raised the costs for any 
new entrant to the job market, particularly for those who get exploited by the local agents.  A 
work visa for an Indian is sold at about USD 2,000, and for an Iranian at about USD 4,000. 
Thus, even after paying USD 2,000 to the agent, an Indian worker has to look for a job for 
himself, and also pay part of his monthly income to the local sponsor of the visa. As 
highlighted by Shah (2005) “… prospective migrants often borrow from friends and relatives 
or sell their meager assets to raise the money for a work visa to the Gulf … housemaids and 
drivers in domestic service earn about the same amount they did 20 years ago … labourers 
and unskilled workers have not seen any appreciable increase in their monthly income and 
earn about USD 140-170 a month. Cost of living has increased while wages have remained 
the same for many categories of workers.” Thus, it is evident that some may have to work for 
several years just to recover the cost they incur for working in the Gulf. 
In respect of the issue of “brain drain” as a cost of  remittances, Adams (2003) studied  
24 labour exporting countries and concluded that even when migrants are well educated, 
international migration does not take a very high proportion of the best educated. In this 
context one can safely infer from the knowledge about local labour market conditions in the 
Gulf that the best and brightest from India do not migrate to the Gulf, and this applies to even 
the skilled category of the expatriate labour force in the Gulf. As noted by Ramamurthy 
(2003), given the high levels of unemployment and underemployment at home in all labour-
exporting Asian countries, there is no brain-drain, and migration rather operates as a safety 
valve to reduce the pressure on employment at home. Unlike the “brain gain” that often 
follows “brain drain” when skilled migrants return to home countries with better skills, 
education and exposure from Western countries, in respect of Gulf migrants, there is little 
scope for the home country to benefit in the form of “brain gain.” 
In every empirical analysis of remittances, and their usefulness to policy making, 
remittance statistics have been a major constraint, which has been adequately recognized all 
over the world now, as is evidenced by the serious work in progress through the IMF 
Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics, Inter Agency Task Force on Statistics for 
International Trade in Services, and the Technical Sub-Group on the Movement of Persons, 
with representations from all concerned international organizations and national statistical as 
well as policy making bodies. There are also discussions on the development of international 
standards and codes on remittances. The paper by Patra and Kapur (2003) offers a vivid 
assessment of the statistical pitfalls in the available information on international as well as 
India’s worker remittances, and they rightly caution the policy makers that “BoP statistics 
are as good as the users find them to be.” With significant increase in the temporary cross-
border movement of labour to deliver services that cannot be exported without the physical 
presence of the service provider, growing use of outsourcing to avoid excessive migration to 
labour-importing countries where migration is becoming politically more and more sensitive, 
and pervasive presence of unrecorded remittances suggest the immense importance of better 
quality statistics on remittances. In this context, the stream of literature on alternative/parallel 
remittance systems could also be useful, including those disseminated by the Interpol.  
The major official initiative in India to study various aspects of migration and remittances 
was in the form of the Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 
(Chairman: Dr. L.M. Singhvi), which was appointed in September 2000 and submitted its 
Report in January 2002. This report touched upon many relevant issues such as dual 
citizenship, problems of overseas Indian labourers, economic development through trade, 
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investment and tourism, better education, health and air travel facilities for the Diaspora, etc., 
There was very little in the Report, however, on the macroeconomic significance of 
remittances to India, and whether a sector- specific approach is necessary for remittances. 
Several regular official publications and occasional reports in India often explain the 
significance of remittances to the Indian economy, but there has never been a mention as to 
why remittances should not be given a special focus like exports, tourism, software/ 
outsourcing, FDI, portfolio flows, ECB, etc. In the next Section, this paper elaborates on the 
immense macroeconomic justification for according greater policy attention to remittances. 
 
 
4. SECTION-III: THE MACRO-ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GREATER 
POLICY FOCUS 
 
The growing neglect of “remittances” in the sphere of macroeconomic policy making 
might have resulted from the lack of adequate realization of the critical significance of this 
sector in shaping the macroeconomic conditions of India. Some of the myths and misplaced 
perceptions influencing this policy neglect are highlighted here. 
 
(a) A major puzzle often noted in the context of India’s macro-economic environment is 
the absence of any strong causal relationship between “fiscal deficits” and “current account 
deficits” in India’s balance of payments. Many have wondered as to why the basic macro-
economic identity [(S-I) + (T-G) = (X-M)] does not hold for India. If the Government 
perpetually runs high fiscal deficits (T-G), as has been the case in India, then the current 
account deficit in the balance of payments should increase correspondingly. One often 
misses out the point here that (X-M) represents “goods and services” in the balance of 
payments of any country, and large remittance inflows can suppress “current account 
deficits” even when a country may still have significant deficit in the “goods and services 
account.” Thus, for countries receiving very low levels of remittances, the causal relationship 
between “fiscal deficit” and “current account deficit” could be much stronger. India being 
the largest recipient of remittances in the world, naturally, the relationship between “fiscal 
deficit” and “current account deficit” becomes much weaker. This becomes clearer with the 
correct representation of the macro-economic identity as [(S-I) + (T-G)] = [(X-M) + (net 
factor income from abroad) + (net current transfers)] = [Current Account Balance (CAB)].  
While the identity discussed earlier relates to GDP, which equals [C+I+G + (X-M)], the 
latter identity relates to Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) = [GDP + (net factor 
income from abroad) + (net current transfers)] = (C + S + T)]. For a country like India with 
large current transfers in the form of private remittances, the one-to-one relationship between 
“fiscal deficit” and “CAB” may break down, even though the causal relationship between 
“fiscal deficit” and (X-M) may still hold. 
This India-specific relationship calls for two major policy inferences: (i) because of large 
remittances, India can run higher fiscal deficits in relation to countries not receiving similar 
magnitude of remittances, and the sustainable levels of fiscal deficits for India (in terms of 
implications for external sector vulnerability) could therefore be relatively higher, and (ii) the 
crowding-out implications of fiscal deficits may be moderated by remittances, since large 
remittances and the associated “overall balance” surpluses in the balance of payments may 
lead to easy monetary conditions. Even when these surpluses are mopped up to build official 
reserves and the resultant monetary impact is neutralized through sterilization operations, 




this certainly enhances the degrees of freedom available to the policy makers to counter the 
crowing-out effects of fiscal deficits. Moreover, remittances add to domestic saving, raising 
thereby national saving of the country, which finance competing needs for funds in India.  
Thus, even though higher fiscal deficits are often resented because of their implications for 
balance of payments vulnerability and crowding-out pressures on private investment, in India, 
remittances considerably relieve these two concerns, and as a result, India can run somewhat 
higher fiscal deficits to promote its growth and developmental objectives in relation to others 
who are not as much privileged as India in terms of annual remittance inflows. The absence 
of strong causal relationship between “fiscal deficit” and “current account deficit” is an 
India- specific “remittance” induced factor, which can be better utilized in formulation of 
fiscal policies.  
(b) Remittance inflows do not cost anything to India, as there is no brain-drain involved 
in it, particularly as far as the large mass of unskilled workers living in the Gulf is concerned. 
At best, it is the demographic dividend to India, arising from large domestic supply of 
unskilled workers who are in search of better or some employment opportunities, which they 
cannot get by remaining in India. The Government does not invest anything on these 
exported unskilled labourers, unlike the skilled counterparts who may migrate to more 
advanced countries after receiving Government subsidized higher education in India. There 
is no other source of foreign exchange earnings in India’s balance of payments like Gulf 
remittances, which comes as a “huge dividend to the country on almost zero investment.” 
Unlike skilled NRIs who often migrate with the families, and as a result, a smaller 
percentage of their annual income may be remitted to India, in respect of unskilled NRIs in 
the Gulf, who leave their families back home, their almost entire income is sent regularly to 
the families left in India, and these Gulf NRIs also face much greater uncertainty about loss 
of job than the skilled ones in advanced countries. As could be seen from Table-1, per-capita 
average monthly remittance from the Gulf is only about USD 190, and if the remittances of 
high-income category within the Gulf NRIs are excluded, then the average per-capita 
monthly remittance of the unskilled workers may just be about USD 100 to USD 150. Most 
of these unskilled workers continue to work at the same wage for years together, whereas 
inflation in India (as well as nominal appreciation of the Indian rupee) consistently erode the 
purchasing power of the remittances for the remittance receiving families in India.  
 (c) Since India’s transition to the unified market determined the exchange rate regime in 
2003, the Indian rupee has depreciated much less in relation to the extent of depreciation 
seen in the national currencies of the countries who compete with  India in exporting labour 
to the Gulf. As a result, assuming all other determinants of labour export to the Gulf as 
constant, appreciated exchange rate of the Indian rupee operates as a major comparative 
disadvantage, since for Indian workers in the Gulf there is always the pressure that workers 
from other competing countries may accept lower salary in USD. Even though purchasing 
power of different national currencies could be different in the respective countries, the 
depreciation induced comparative advantage of other labour exporting countries from Asia to 
the Gulf is a fact which affects the wage bargaining conditions of Indian workers in the Gulf. 
Since the exchange rates of all six Gulf countries are effectively pegged to the US dollar, it is 
the Rupee-USD nominal exchange rate that is the most relevant for meaningful comparison 
of comparative advantage of India in exporting labour. As could be seen from Chart-1A, 
which presents nominal exchange rates of the currencies of the competing labour-exporting 
countries to the Gulf (with respect to scale 1993 = 100 against the USD), the exchange rate 
of the Indian Rupee-USD in 2005 remains the least depreciated in relation to comparable 
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2005 levels for others, implying potential erosion in competitiveness of Indian unskilled 
labour. The family members who benefit from such remittances also see erosion in 
purchasing power of remittances because of domestic inflation. Chart-1B shows that 
cumulative CPI-based inflation in competing labour-exporting countries like Egypt, 
Bangladesh and Philippines were somewhat lower than that of India during 1993 to 2005. If  
 
 




















































Chart-1A: Nominal Exchange Rates in 2005 











Chart-1B: Cumulative CPI Based Inflation in 2005  














Chart-1C: Exchange Rates Deflated by CPI Inflation in 
2005 (In Relation to 1993=100)




countries with lower inflation experienced relatively higher depreciation of their nominal 
exchange rates against the US dollar, that provides a more meaningful indication of clear 
erosion in the competitiveness of India in supplying unskilled labour to the Gulf. Statistically, 
nominal exchange rate index (1993 = 100) deflated by the index of CPI (1993 = 100), could 
offer more clarity on the issue of implied competitiveness of unskilled expatriate workforce 
in the Gulf. As could be seen from Chart-1C, India clearly lags behind its competitors in the 
Gulf unskilled labour market because the combined effect of lower nominal depreciation and 
higher domestic inflation gives rise to a situation when the purchasing power of one USD 
remittance in 1993 = 100 falls to little above 65 in 2005, whereas in all other competing 
countries the erosion is much less than that of India. Sri Lanka and Pakistan had higher 
cumulative domestic inflation, but their nominal exchange rates also depreciated much more, 
as a result of which India remained as the least competitive as per the trend presented in 
Chart-1C. It is largely various non-exchange rate based factors that explain the dominance of 
Indian expatriates in non-national workforce in the Gulf. 
(d) The economic development potential of the remittances is often underestimated. 
Remittances, particularly from the Gulf region help in addressing the problems of poverty 
and unemployment for the family members receiving the remittance. Most of the times 
remittances serve as the seed capital, for setting up small business ventures by the family 
members of the remitter living in India. In view of the pilferages associated with 
Government sponsored anti-poverty or employment generation programmers, including 
external aid, remittances have a comparatively stronger and more direct effect on poverty 
and employment. In respect of remittances from the Gulf, the development effect is the 
maximum, because most of the Gulf NRIs return at some stage to India (who may be 
replaced by Indians again) because of the contract-based employment opportunities available 
in the Gulf. While the contracts may be renewed over several years, there is no scope for 
permanent employment and settlement in the Gulf. Saving for the uncertain future not only is 
a key factor behind large remittances in relation to average income of Gulf expatriates, but 
subsequent effective use also explains the high developmental potential. In formulating any 
remittance-focused macroeconomic policy, this stronger developmental potential of 
remittances could be extremely relevant. 
(e) Despite the disappearance of black market premium in the foreign exchange market in 
India, remittances through informal channels are still in vogue, even though of much less 
magnitude than in the past. The main factor contributing to the sustained faith in the informal 
channels could be both “trust and convenience” as well as low “transaction costs”. 
Lamenting the high transaction costs in the range of 13 to 20 percent, one World Bank 
estimates reported in Ratha (2003) suggested that  reducing the transaction costs to even 10 
percent could save the workers and their families up to USD 3.5 billion a year for the world 
as a whole. Any unskilled Gulf NRI remitting about USD 100 a month would naturally 
prefer hassle free, reliable and low cost remittance vehicles. No wonder why even some of 
the Indian construction supervisors often easily operate as informal vehicles for remitting the 
funds of workers in the same construction site, particularly when both tend to be from the 
same region in India, enhancing thereby the smoothness of transfers at low cost.  Besides 
these informal transfers, there are also transfers in kind. Most of the Gulf NRIs carry goods 
as part of personal baggage while visiting India up to the permitted limit of Rs.25,000. The 
officially published remittance figures often cannot capture such remittances in kind. 
Moreover, such NRI’s who are overstaying in the Gulf beyond the expiry dates of valid visas, 
they may also prefer informal modes of transfers, particularly because of the tightening of 
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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms under AML/CFT guidelines applicable to banks and 
exchange houses in the Gulf. Official statistics for UAE as per its 2005 census shows that 
such expatriates working in the UAE with invalid visas could number around 300,000. 
Similarly for Oman, the corresponding number could be about 170,000. Going by this 
available indicative information, total number of expatriate workers without valid visas could 
be expected to exceed about 1 million in the entire Gulf. There could also be differences 
between data compiled by the receiving country, and data collected by the remittance 
sending country, since in the data of the sending Gulf countries some of the remittances may 
also include capital transactions (such as remittances sent for credit to various NRI deposit 
schemes or for investment in stock market and real estate). There are also India-specific 
statistical issues, as noted by Patra and Kapur (2003), such as treatment of gold and silver 
imports by the NRIs as part of personal baggage, local withdrawals from NRI deposits, 
securitization of remittances through issuance of foreign currency bonds to NRIs, etc. The 
Report of the Working Group on Cost of NRI remittances submitted in May 2006 also 
highlights the high transaction costs and the need to reduce that, even though it offers little 
on how to contain the size of the unrecorded remittances coming through informal channels. 
India, being the largest beneficiary of remittance flows in the world, it could also provide the 
lead in terms of developing statistical standards and practices for remittances.  
(f) Because of remittances, India’s “national disposable income” exceeds its “GDP”, and 
in 2005-06 remittances were as high as 3.1% of India’s GDP (implying that without 
remittances, India’s current account deficit would immediately turn unsustainable). Besides 
the direct contribution of “remittances” to the “national disposable income”, there could be 
more significant contribution to the GDP itself, because remittances are generally spent on 
domestic consumption and investment. While the domestic investment part of the 
remittances contributes directly to higher GDP and poverty reduction in India, the 
consumption part of the remittances also assumes significance for GDP growth in a market 
economy where production responds to demand. Because of multiplier effects, one estimate 
for Mexico reported in Ratha (2003) suggested that Mexican GNP rose by USD 2.69 to USD 
3.17 per every dollar of remittance received from the US. It may be important to conduct a 
comprehensive survey to identify the consumption and investment components of 
remittances in India and the possible multiplier effects, since that could be useful to better 
appreciate the contribution of remittances to economic growth in India. As far as unskilled 
Gulf NRIs are concerned, the statistical distinction in terms of remittances (in the current 
account) and NRI deposits and investments (in the financial account) are much less relevant, 
since effectively all of that are essentially unrequited transfers to India, though not on a year-
to-year basis, but only over several years, given the fact that most Gulf NRIs return to India 
permanently at some point of time. Because of the uncertain job market conditions, many of 
the unskilled NRIs return to India to start their own small business using savings 
accumulated from Gulf income. Such workers may get replaced by new unskilled workers, 
but in this cyclical process, majority of them return to India at some point of time, and use 
their accumulated savings for some kind of self-employment. Periodic survey of returning 
NRIs from the Gulf can also throw useful policy inferences, which can be applied 
appropriately in a remittance focused national policy framework. 
One such survey on “Activity Status and Rehabilitation of Migrants from Kerala” 
conducted in 1999 suggested that out of 11.41 Keralites working elsewhere all over the 
world, 95.6 percent were in the Gulf. While more than 19 percent of them received less than 
Rs. 5, 000 per month, more than 50 percent received monthly income between Rs. 5,000 and 




10, 000; and another 21 percent had monthly income between Rs.10, 000 to Rs. 20, 000. 
Only 0.2 percent of the migrant Kerlaites had an income of Rs. one lakh (100 thousand) or 
more. [The much hyped Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)-type congregations held in India in 
January every year project essentially the achievements of this small fraction of NRIs, and it 
is their concerns that make the Government machineries sensitive. The problems and 
challenges of the majority of poor Gulf NRIs are discussed, at best, only to avoid any 
criticism from any quarter, rather than to address those with concrete action plans.] The 
survey also indicated that 5.43 lakh migrants had returned permanently to Kerala after 
working for several years outside for a variety of reasons. The importance of such surveys 
will be valued immensely only when a clear remittance-focused policy strategy is formulated 
at the macro level in India. Return migration as a potential source of economic development 
in India must also be recognized. Regular surveys can help in delineating the temporary and 
permanent nature of migration to the Gulf, and accordingly the consumption or investment 
focus of remittance flows from the Gulf. 
(g) India is insulated to a large extent from the adverse effects of oil price shocks because 
of remittances. While India’s oil import bills increase as a result of upswings in oil price 
cycles, remittances from the Gulf into India also receive a boost on account of higher 
investment of surplus oil revenue in the Gulf countries, which essentially involves higher 
demand for cheap labour from labour-exporting countries like India (Chart-2). Unlike the 
earlier episodes of oil price boom, the current phase of surge in oil prices coincided with 
deliberate policy shift in the Gulf countries to use a large part of the surplus oil revenue to 
diversify their economies, so that gradually the dependence on oil could be reduced over 
time, and the economies could thereby be better insulated from adverse oil cycle scenarios. 
Projections based on existing investment trends and plans for accelerated investment in the 
future in several mega projects suggest that the Gulf region could experience an investment 
boom of USD 600 billion over the next 5 years period (which some very optimistic 
assessments  project to be of about USD 1 trillion, with construction sector investment in 
Dubai city alone exceeding USD 200 billion.) There will be a corresponding increase in 
demand for both skilled and unskilled expatriate workers, despite the Government focus of 
all the Gulf countries to reduce the dependence on expatriate labour force in order to be able 
to provide gainful employment opportunities to Gulf nationals, who continue to face the 
problem of comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis expatriate counterparts who accept very low 
wages (in relation to minimum wages for Gulf nationals) and work for much longer hours 
with much greater efficiency and sincerity. India must take note of the fact that unlike many 
other major oil-importing countries, the impact of the adverse terms-of-trade arising from oil 
prices is insulated to the largest extent possible through remittances (Chart-2). For example, 
in 2005-06, while India’s oil import bills were about USD 44 billion, remittances of about 
USD 24.6 billion relieved the pressure on balance of payments to a considerable extent. No 
other country enjoys this natural process of shock-insulation, and India must realize that 
declines in oil prices also carry the risk of weakening of employment prospects for all 
expatriate workers in the Gulf. During downswings in oil prices, sustaining high outward 
remittances becomes politically sensitive in the Gulf, particularly because of high 
unemployment rates among Gulf nationals. Even though India’s remittance pattern has 
diversified considerably away from the Gulf in the last decade or so, about 30 percent of the 
remittances still come from the Gulf, and the pro-cyclical movement of remittances and 
India’s oil import bills, and the resultant insulation of the oil price shock, must be better 
appreciated in the sphere of macroeconomic policy making in India.  
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Moreover, unlike earlier episodes of oil price booms when large part of the surplus oil 
income of the oil-exporting Gulf countries used to get invested in the markets of advanced 
countries, in the current phase of high oil prices, there has been a diversification in the 
deployment of Government reserve assets of the Gulf countries in favour of Asia, including 
India. There is a general perception that Asia is heavily underweight in their investment 
strategies, particularly in the context of generally perceived future relative growth prospects 
of Asia in the world, and also in partial response to post 9/11 developments in the advanced 
financial systems. Thus, as far as India is concerned, the impact of oil price induced terms-
of-trade shock can potentially be countered by not only high NRI remittances, but also 


















(h) India also gains immense diplomatic benefits internationally, since the presence of 
large Indian expatriates community in the Gulf allows the Government to receive diplomatic 
support from these Gulf countries, who otherwise could possibly have been more neutral or 
even hostile to India for other non-economic reasons. The contributions of Indian expatriates 
to the Gulf region, in terms of transforming financial resources (generated through oil 
exports) into real growth and development, is widely recognized in the Gulf, and that has 
significantly won diplomatic gains for the Indian Government, even though Indian 
Embassies and Consulates in the Gulf are generally seen by the unskilled Indian NRIs as the 
least sensitive and least effective in terms of addressing their concerns and problems, in 
relation to their counterparts from other labour-exporting countries of Asia. The Indian 
expatriate community at large has earned immense diplomatic gains for India in the Gulf 
through their hard work, and it must be seen as a rare example that India benefits in both 
ways, i.e. it receives money (or remittances) and at the same time also draws diplomatic 
gains, unlike countries who often use money (such as aid and other preferential economic 
concessions) to be able to gain diplomatic favour. There is no other source of foreign 
exchange in India’s balance of payments (including bilateral trade agreements to promote 
trade in goods and services), which can be viewed to have yielded stronger diplomatic gains 
for India than the export of unskilled labour to the Gulf region. India’s recent economic 
achievements, and the consequent change in international perception about India’s potential, 
have certainly been immensely significant to India in terms of raising the force behind its 
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claim for greater global importance, and voice in global governance. But remittances from 
the Gulf have all along been a strong and permanent source of comfort for India, both 
politically and economically, and separate policy focus for this sector with a clearer strategy 
can only further enhance the demographic dividend for India. 
 (i)  A long-term strategy by India on remittances can also help the global economy 
immensely, both in terms of higher global growth and lower global inflation. Central banks 
are increasingly realizing that excess demand (and even excess money growth) may not be 
causing higher inflation these days, because part of the excess demand may be met by supply 
from the cheapest sources (such as outsourcing to India, and falling imported manufacturing 
prices because of the growing importance of China in the globalisation process), and another 
part of the excess demand may encourage inward migration of cheap labour which can keep 
the costs of production lower. The second type of labour movement in relation to excess 
demand has delivered a very low inflation regime in the entire Gulf for a pretty long period. 
Being open economies, imports from the cheapest possible sources anywhere in the world 
also help in keeping the inflationary pressure of excess demand under check in the Gulf. In 
effect, it is comparative advantage of India (in terms of cheaper but more efficient unskilled 
as well as skilled labour) which is being exported to the Gulf, and in that sense remittances 
could be seen as a substitute of exports. Since some of the services are non-tradable and 
physical presence is required to deliver the service (starting from house maids, to 
construction workers, to farm labourers to other jobs like plumbing, electrification, 
transportation, hotel maintenance, etc.), remittances must be seen  as equivalent of export of 
services, in an  analytical sense though.   
During the early phase of the current wave of globalization, when MNCs found it 
difficult to export to some markets because of protectionist barriers, they entered those 
markets with foreign direct investment, and their domestic sales in the “host country” were 
as good as “exports from the parent country.” Thus, for MNCs, “domestic sales” were 
effective substitutes for “exports.” In the current phase of globalization, India has emerged as 
a major service provider to the world economy through export of labour, which does not 
appear as “service exports in India’s balance of payments,” and only part of the export of 
India’s comparative advantage is realized in the form of remittances. It must be noted here 
that the import of this argument is not to be seen in terms of mere correct statistical 
classification of balance of payments transactions consistent with the balance of payments 
manual of the IMF, but in terms of the analytical force and the unrecognized harsh reality 
associated with export of labour, which can go a long way in developing a more appropriate 
policy framework focused on remittances in India. The issue of relationship between 
“migration” and “trade in services” was discussed in the November 2003 meeting of the 
IOM, OECD and the World Bank recognizing the growing importance of supply of (or trade 
in) services via the temporary movement across borders of natural persons. For analytical 
purpose (disregarding rigid statistical classification of transactions), “remittances from the 
Gulf could be best viewed as export of services”, and hence “remittances” deserve to receive 
at least as much policy attention as exports.  
During the current phase of India’s globalization process, unlike clearer beneficial impact 
on growth and productivity, the consequences of globalization for poverty, unemployment, 
inequality, etc. have often been highlighted to stall further reform. With a clearer policy on 
remittances, it could be much easier to justify the beneficial impact of a major channel of 
globalization in the form of labour mobility (which generates remittance flows) in addressing 
poverty and rural unemployment. Earlier phases of globalization in economic history would 
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also suggest that labor movement has been much more beneficial in relation to movement of 
goods, services and capital (Williamson, 1998). As a major labour-exporting country, a 
clearer policy on remittances and labour movement can also help India in contributing 
constructively to the global policy debates on harnessing the benefits of globalization. Many 
labour-exporting countries could benefit from a future course of globalization that is more 
open to freer cross-border labour movement. There is already a growing realization, at least 
among the central bankers, that labor mobility contributes to higher global growth as well as 
lower global inflation. 
 
Options to end the policy of benign neglect:  
 
The immense macroeconomic significance of remittances to India clearly explains the 
need for policy activism that is more sensitive to the genuine expectations of Indian NRIs in 
the Gulf. Even though in a market economy it could be increasingly difficult to link policies 
on exchange rate, interest rate, bank credit and fiscal incentives to the needs of specific 
sectors, taking into consideration the fact that sector specific preferential policies are still in 
vogue in India, several preferential policy actions favouring the unskilled NRIs in the Gulf 
could be explored, which include: 
 
(i) Creating a fund with annual budgetary allocations, which could be used for financing 
the initial high cost of securing an employment contract in the Gulf (unskilled labourers often 
have to pay USD 1000 to USD 2000 to the agents, who in turn arrange only an employment 
visa through a local sponsor in the Gulf, and such visas do not guarantee any job. At times, 
after getting the visa, the person concerned has to look for a job, and also pay regularly part of 
his income to the local sponsor.) Since there are many exclusively earmarked funds in India 
with large budgetary allocations meant for poverty eradication and rural employment 
generation, a similar Fund supporting export of unskilled workers from India could be useful.  
(ii) A part of the remittances received in India by the family members of unskilled NRIs is 
spent on education and health services. In Government-run or Government-aided academic 
institutions and hospitals, preferential and concessional access may be provided to the family 
members of the NRIs in the Gulf. 
(iii) Reducing the transaction costs of remittances and ensuring the best possible exchange 
rate to the NRIs could be an important area for policy attention. If the commercial banks in 
India are given some tax concession based on their performance in attracting remittances, 
competition among banks could automatically ensure lower transaction costs and better 
exchange rates for the NRIs. 
(iv) Commercial banks could start exclusive schemes to lend to returning unskilled NRIs 
for any new small business, possibly at concessional   interest rate, and such schemes could be 
brought under the priority sector lending regulations in India. 
(v) Returning Gulf NRIs who use their past remittances for starting new ventures in India, 
could be allowed 3 to 5 years tax break. Unlike migration to other countries, permanent 
migration to the Gulf is not possible, implying that every Gulf NRI has to return to India some 
day, with a considerable number of them possibly returning within 5-10 years. Tax-breaks 
could not only attract more remittances, but may also lead to higher percentage of remittances 
being put to investment activities, as opposed to consumption. 




(vi) Just as senior citizens could get about 1 percent higher interest rate on their deposits 
with the commercial banks, NRI deposits up to a limit (say 2 lakh) could also be permitted to 
fetch 1 percent higher interest rate in relation to normal deposits in Indian banks.  
(vii) In the conduct of the exchange rate policy in a managed exchange rate regime, if 
implications for export competitiveness influence to any extent a policy of prevention of 
nominal appreciation of the Indian rupee, then implications of nominal appreciation for 
competitiveness of Indian unskilled workers in the Gulf labour market could also be kept in 
view. Chart 1A to 1C clearly reveal the adverse implications of nominal rupee appreciation for 
the competitiveness of  Indian expatriates working in the Gulf vis-à-vis the expatriates of other  
labour exporting countries working in  the Gulf. 
(viii) Private operators in the infrastructure and agricultural sectors (the two critical 
constraints to high and sustainable growth in India) could be permitted to raise long-term tax-
free bonds, which could be subscribed by NRIs only. While ensuring stable long-term supply 
of finance for infrastructure and agriculture, such a policy can also offer higher returns to NRIs 
on their accumulated savings. 
 
In the past, bonds targeted at NRIs have been issued as a matter of public policy only in the 
face of actual or anticipated pressures on India’s balance of payments. Higher interest rates 
offered on NRI deposits in the past also seem to have attracted certain hot money, on account 
of the risk-free arbitrage opportunities. The immense significance of remittances to the 
country as explained in this section, however, suggest the need for a more focused policy 
attention, and the above list of action points should not be ignored by branding them as a list 
of irrational expectations.  
  
 
5. SECTION-IV: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The Indian story of remittances from the Gulf could be best explained as a case of “rich 
dividend to the country on zero investment”, and as an example of how a policy of “benign 
neglect” can reap rich harvest. Despite being the largest beneficiary of remittances in the 
world in terms of absolute magnitude of annual inflows, there is no clear policy in India on 
how to augment the inflow of this costless source of foreign exchange, and how to enhance 
the growth and developmental effects of remittances. There is a general perception in the 
Gulf that a policy of “benign neglect” of remittances is clearly evident in the macroeconomic 
policy making in India, unlike other important sources of foreign exchange inflows such as 
exports of goods and services, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, external 
commercial borrowings, and the inflows associated with the green field software and 
outsourcing business. In respect of all other important sources of foreign exchange that get 
specific policy attention, exports may have an import content, and FDI, portfolio and ECB 
flows raise correspondingly the external payments liabilities of India, both in the current and 
capital accounts of the balance of payments. As unrequited transfers, remittances have no 
repayment obligations, what so ever. Without remittances, India’s external balance position 
may still appear vulnerable and unsustainable, in terms of resultant higher current account 
deficits, or lower foreign exchange reserves, or much higher levels of external liabilities 
incurred possibly at a much higher cost. Accordingly, variability in economic growth and 
investment, as well as volatility in the exchange rate would have been much higher.  
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Remittance inflows from the Gulf have significant beneficial macroeconomic 
implications for India, such as fiscal and balance of payments sustainability, insulation from 
adverse terms-of-trade shocks associated with high oil prices, higher growth as well as 
economic development in the form of reduction in poverty, generation of employment, and 
improved access to basic amenities of life for the family members of the migrant workers. As 
the leading labour-exporting country to the Gulf, there are diplomatic gains to India as well, 
and the sheer magnitude of the remittances also provides enough indication about the 
benefits of globalization associated with cross-border movement of labour. In terms of 
sectoral prioritization, remittances may come next to none, and this aspect needs better 
reflection in the sphere of macroeconomic policy making in India. There could be a 
justification behind India’s current policy of “benign neglect,” since having a formal policy 
on as sensitive an issue like labour migration as a major labour- exporting country could be 
difficult. But taking into consideration the rich harvest reaped by the country in the form of 
remittances, and their strong growth and developmental implications in relation to other 
sources of inflows of foreign exchange, special sector- specific attention in the sphere of 
macroeconomic policy making could be desirable. If the voice of every sector/interest-group 
counts in India’s democratic process of decision making, the interest of the migrant workers 
in the Gulf must also be kept in perspective while formulating macroeconomic policies, 
starting from exchange rate, to interest rate, to bank credit to use of various fiscal instruments. 
It is open for debate as to whether the current macroeconomic environment in India is 
sensitive to the concerns of migrant workers in the Gulf, and whether the immense 
macroeconomic significance of remittances justify a special, and possibly preferential, 
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